

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

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P 201315Z AUG 76

FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7781

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 5469

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR SILBERMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: YO

REFS: (A) STATE 190187 (B) BELGRADE 4464 (C) BELGRADE 5084

1. I HAVE GIVEN A GOOD DEAL OF THOUGHT TO YOUR CABLE
AS I PROMISED AND HERewith IS MY RESPONSE.

REVIEW OF BIDDING

2. I AM SURPRISED YOU FEEL AGGRIEVED AT MY CRITICISM
OF EE; IT WAS CERTAINLY FORESHADOWED. I THOUGHT YOU HAD
AGREED IN PARIS TO EFFECTIVELY REBUT THE ITEM IN THE
WSJ AND TO ASSERT YOUR SUPPORT OF MY ACTIONS IN BELGRADE.
I REMINDED YOU AND LARRY SEVERAL TIMES OF THAT AND
IN REFTEL (B) MADE CLEAR THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH
ACTION I WOULD HAVE "NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO DEFEND
MYSELF." (ALTHOUGH LARRY'S LUNCH WITH BELOVSKI WAS
HELPFUL, I EMPHASIZED TO BOTH OF YOU THAT IN MY VIEW
IT WAS INSUFFICIENT.) SINCE THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
LEAK AROSE OUT OF MY EFFORTS HERE ON BEHALF OF TOTH,
EFFORTS CRITICIZED BY EE, (THE JOURNAL TOLD
ME SOURCES WERE AUTHORITATIVE IMPLYING SENIOR TYPES
IN EE), I THOUGHT IT APPROPRIATE TO USE THE OCCASION OF
TOTH'S RELEASE TO REDRESS ACCOUNTS AS WELL AS EFFECTIVELY WARN
AMERICAN DUAL NATIONALS OF THE DANGER OF TRAVELING IN YUGOSLAVIA.

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I NEVER INTENDED TO DO SO INEFFECTIVELY.

3. AS I TOLD YOU IN PARIS, THE WSJ PIECE CONFIRMED WHAT THE GOY HAD ALREADY PICKED UP IN WASHINGTON; I.E., EE WAS UNDERMINING MY POSITION HERE IN BELGRADE. BY PUBLICLY CRITICIZING EE, I DID NOT TELL THE GOY ANYTHING THAT IT DIDN'T ALREADY KNOW; I HOPED THAT YOUR UNEQUIVOCAL SUPPORT WOULD DISARM THEIR EFFORTS TO DIVIDE AND CONQUER.

4. I DON'T BELIEVE THERE WAS ANY MISWNDERSTANDING CONCERNING MY SPEECH AT BLED. I SAW NO REASON TO "CLEAR THE SPEECH" WITH EE. THE SUBSTANCE TRACKED CLOSELY WITH THE SPEECH CARROLL BROWN, THEN DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF EE, HAD GIVEN BEFORE THE SAME AUDIENCE IN NEW YORK (AT MY URGING). IN ANY EVENT, I WOULD NOT CONSULT BUREAUCRATS AS TO THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE SPEECH AND IT WAS NOT IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO COMMAND YOUR ATTENTION. AMBASSADOR BELOVSKI DID NOT INFORM DEPARTMENT OF DECISION TO RELEASE TOTH UNTIL AFTER MY SPEECH WAS GIVEN AND THE GOY KNEW BEFOREHAND THAT I WAS GOING TO RAISE TOTH IN THE SPEECH. IT IS ALSO WORTH NOTING THAT EVEN THEN BELOVSKI REFUSED TO GIVE A SPECIFIC DATE. SO IN THAT RESPECT, HIS ANNOUNCEMENT WAS REALLY NOTHING NEW (VARIOUS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOY HAD BEEN SAYING FOR OVER SIX MONTHS THAT TOTH WOULD BE RELEASED EVENTUALLY).

5. IF YOU EXAMINE THE REMARKS THAT I MADE AT THE AIRPORT (BELGRADE 5084), YOU WILL SEE THAT I DID NOT SAY THAT THE EAST EUROPEAN SECTION JUSTIFIED INADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR MY EFFORTS TO RELEASE TOTH ON GROUNDS HE WAS A RECENT CITIZEN (ALTHOUGH ONE OFFICIAL DID MENTION THAT AS A MITIGATING FACTOR). I AM SURE EE WOULD BE EQUALLY INEFFECTIVE ON BEHALF OF A SIXTH GENERATION AMERICAN. MY STATEMENT REFERRED TO THE YUGOSLAVS WHO CONTINUALLY MADE THAT POINT AND STILL DO.

6. I WAS SURPRISED AT YOUR REFERENCE TO THE DEDICATED MIDDLE AND JUNIOR LEVEL OFFICERS IN THE DEPARTMENT

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WHO ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. I REMEMBER YOUR COMMENTS IN PARIS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FOREIGN SERVICE ONCE WORKED IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES, LATER FOR THE INTEREST OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND NOW IN THE INTEREST OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE. MOREOVER, THEIR COWARDLY ANONYMOUS LEAKS AS REFLECTED IN BOTH THE WSJ PIECE AND THE RECENT TIME AND NEWSWEEK ARTICLES REVEAL THAT THEY

ARE PERFECTLY ABLE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES; THEY ARE
SIMPLY UNWILLING TO DO SO OPENLY.

THE TOTH CASE

7. AS I TOLD YOU EARLIER THE CHRONOLOGY WHICH THE
DEPARTMENT DISTRIBUTED IS MISLEADING AND INACCURATE.
A CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF ALL THE CABLES WILL SHOW
THAT THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT DO A DAMN THING OTHER THAN
WHAT I PRESSED THEM TO DO AND THEN DID IT IN A RELATIVELY
INEFFECTIVE FASHION. PERHAPS MOST DAMAGING WAS MINIC' FALL
VISIT WHICH GAVE GOY IMPRESSION THAT DEPARTMENT,
AS OPPOSED TO CONGRESS, DID NOT CARE THAT MUCH ABOUT
TOTH CASE OR FOR THAT MATTER OTHER CONTENTIOUS ISSUES.
(I AM SURE THE FACT THAT YOU DID NOT RAISE TOTH WITH
SECRETARY MINIC REFLECTED INADEQUATE STAFF WORK). I
FOUND IT NECESSARY IN NOVEMBER TO CHIDE EE BY WRITING
(BELGRADE 6172) "IT IS TRAGIC IN PRINCIPLE IF SOME IN
DEPARTMENT GIVE IMPRESSION THEY CARE LITTLE OF ISSUES
OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO AMERICANS AS A PEOPLE." AS EARLY
AS OCTOBER AND REPEATEDLY THEREAFTER I URGED DEPARTMENT
TO PUBLICLY WARN AMERICANS OF DUAL NATIONALITY ABOUT THE
RISKS OF TRAVELING TO YUGOSLAVIA, AN ACTION WHICH WAS NOT
TAKEN IN MARCH BUT ONLY QUITE RECENTLY (AND RELATIVELY
INEFFECTIVELY). AT LEAST ONE COURAGEOUS OFFICER IN EE
IN A PRIVATE LETTER TO ME DID RECOGNIZE DEPARTMENT'S
INADEQUACIES ON TOTH CASE STATING "WE HAVE PUSSYFOOTED
AROUND TOO LONG."

8. IN LATE NOVEMBER I RESPONDED TO QUERIES FROM NYTIMES
AND WASHINGTON POST ABOUT THE CASE AFTER THE WIRE
SERVICES HAD PICKED UP AN ANNOUNCEMENT IN COLORADO.
WHEN I MET ART HARTMAN IN LONDON THE NEXT MONTH, HE TOLD
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ME EE HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF THAT AND HAD EVEN TOLD HIM THAT
I HAD INITIATED PRESS ATTENTION BY MAKING THE ANNOUNCEMENT
IN BELGRADE. I AM INFORMED THAT EE AND THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY
IN WASHINGTON CLUCK-CLUCKED MUTUALLY ABOUT MY STATEMENTS TO THE
PRESS WHICH OF COURSE DID NOT STRENGTHEN MY POSITION OR HELP
TOTH.

9. IT WAS OUR CONCLUSION THAT DEPARTMENTAL BRIEFINGS OF
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS ABOUT THAT CASE--AND INDEED ABOUT
OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN IN U.S.-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS WERE
INADEQUATE. IT WAS NECESSARY TO DO THE JOB IN BELGRADE.

10. FINALLY, AS I TOLD DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ARMITAGE IN MAY, I WAS TROUBLED BY THE FACT THAT NO
DEPARTMENT OFFICER CALLED BELOVSKI IN ON THE TOTH

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FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7782

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 5469

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR SILBERMAN

CASE ALONE AND REALLY PINNED HIM ON THE ISSUE. MY JUDGEMENT IS THAT HE RAN RINGS AROUND EE. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE RAISED THE ISSUE DUTIFULLY IN EVERY MEETING WITH BELOVSKI FOR THE ENTIRE SEVEN YEARS OF TOTH'S SENTENCE.

11. I MUST SAY, HOWEVER, THAT ART HARTMAN, WHEN HE DID GET INVOLVED, WAS MUCH BETTER. PARENTHETICALLY -- AS I HAVE TOLD ART -- IT IS A SHAME THAT WE DID NOT SPEND MORE TIME TOGETHER FROM THE BEGINNING OF MY ASSIGNMENT HERE.

12. IN SUM THEN, MY DISAGREEMENTS WITH EE OVER THE TOTH CASE ARE TWOFOLD. ON THIS, AS ON MANY OTHER ISSUES, MY JUDGEMENT IS THAT THEY WERE NOT TOUGH ENOUGH. THEY DO NOT PRESS ISSUES TO CLOSURE AND IF I WERE YOU I WOULDN'T LET THEM NEGOTIATE THE SALE OF AN ICE CREAM CONE. I WAS HEARTENED BY ART'S ADMISSION TO ME WHEN HE WAS IN BELGRADE THAT HE WAS NOT ENAMORED WITH THE PERSONNEL IN EE. LOWENSTEIN ONCE SUGGESTED THAT THE DUBCEK CRISIS OF 1968 KNOCKED THE STUFFING OUT OF THE OFFICERS SPECIALIZING IN EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS WHICH CONFIRMS THE WISDOM OF YOUR GLOP POLICY. THE BEST OFFICERS I HAVE SEEN DEALING WITH EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS HAVE COME FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION OR FROM MOSCOW.

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QEM SECONDLY, EE CONTINUOUSLY OBJECTED TO MY PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE TOTH CASE TO THE PRESS AS WELL AS MAKING THE SPEECH IN BLED. IT IS THEIR VIEW THAT IT IS THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO SEEK TO PREVENT UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY IN THE U.S. RE YUGOSLAVIA. AS I ARGUE BELOW, THAT IS FUNDAMENTALLY INCORRECT, AND WITHOUT PUBLICITY TOTH WOULD STILL BE IN JAIL.

POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA

14. YOU MENTION THAT WE ARE IN BASIC AGREEMENT ON THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH YUGOSLAVIA AS REFLECTED IN MY CABLE OF JUNE 26. IN THAT CABLE I THOROUGHLY SUPPORTED YOUR SPEECH IN LONDON WHICH DEALT WITH GLOBAL AND PARTICULARLY EUROPEAN POLICY (EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF IDEOLOGY). AS I RECALL IN PARIS WE DIDN'T GET A CHANCE TO DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH YUGOSLAVIA AT GREAT LENGTH, BUT I TOLD YOU THAT LAST MARCH I HAD SUBMITTED A POLICY ASSESSMENT PAPER WHICH BOTHERED EE AND I HAVE YET TO GET A FORMAL RESPONSE TO THAT PAPER FROM THE DEPARTMENT ALTHOUGH VARIOUS OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED DISAGREEMENT WITH MY ADVOCATING LINKAGE (AND LEVERAGE) OF OUR SCIENTIFIC AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT WITH YUGOSLAV MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL POSITIONS. CONCERNING THE DEMARCHE ON ANGOLA, I DID TELL ART HARTMAN (WHO THOROUGHLY AGREED) THAT ITS WORDING WAS TOO TOUGH SINCE IT ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED A RESPONSE ON OUR PART. IN SUBSEQUENT CABLES I ARGUED THAT WE COULD NOT TELL THE YUGOSLAVS THAT PERMITTING SOVIET OVER-FLIGHTS TO ANGOLA WOULD AFFECT OUR RELATIONSHIP AND NOT RESPOND IN SOME FASHION WITHOUT SUFFERING A SERIOUS DIMINUTPQN OF OUR CREDIBILITY, AND OUR CREDIBILITY VIS-A-VIS YUGOSLAVIA IS OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE IN THE EVENT OF A POST-TITO CRISIS. AS I HAVE OFTEN SAID IN THE LAST YEAR AND IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY ALL SOURCES, OUR MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM IN YUGOSLAVIA IS THAT TITO AND OTHERS IN THE LEADERSHIP CONSIDER US CONSIDERABLY WEAKER VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS (IN TERMS OF POLITICAL WILL) THAN WE WERE 20 OR EVEN 10 YEARS AGO. THE NAMBY-PAMBY WAY IN WHICH EE SEEKS TO
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DEAL WITH THE YUGOSLAVS IS NOT ENGENDERING AN IMPRESSION

OF STRENGTH. OUR BYWORD IN DEALING WITH THE YUGOSLAVS SHOULD BE RECIPROCITY. THEY CONTINUE TO CHERISH THE VIEW THAT OUR STAKE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP IS GREATER THAN THEIRS AND THEREFORE WE WILL INVARIJRLY TURN THE OTHER CHEEK. THEY PRESS ISSUES OF VITAL INTEREST TO THEM USING EVERY BIT OF LEVERAGE THEY CAN MUSTER AND HAVE OVER THE YEARS EFFECTIVELY DISARMED US FROM RESPONDING IN KIND. MOREOVER, THEY OFTEN DISSEMBLE (OUTRIGHT LIE) ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN WITH CONFIDENCE THAT WE WILL NOT FASHION A MEASURED RESPONSE.

15. ALTHOUGH IT IS QUITE TRUE THAT YOUR OWN VIEWS ON US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS DIFFER CONSIDERABLY FROM EE (AS EE MADE CLEAR IN MY INITIAL BRIEFINGS PRIOR TO LEAVING WASHINGTON), I REMAIN PUZZLED AT EE'S SEEMING ABILITY TO INSULATE PNS DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS FROM YOUR POLICY VIEWS. PERHAPS IT IS BECAUSE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF PARA 16 OF YOUR CABLE. I AGREE THOROUGHLY THAT THE TIME MAY WELL COME WHEN A U.S. RESPONSE TO A SOVIET POST-TITO INITIATIVE WILL BE REQUIRED AND TT T U.S. PUBLIC OPINION, AS WAS TRUE IN ANGOLA, MAY BE DECISIVE. IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT I FIRMLY BELIEVE WE MUST MAKE STRONGER EFFORTS TO MODERATE YUGOSLAV BEHAVIOR INIMICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS, ANDK PUBLICITY GIVEN SUCH MATTERS AS THE TOTH CASE OR YUGOSLAV MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY INsofar AS IT AIDS IN PRESSURING THE GOY SHOULD NOT BE ESCHEWED. IT TELLS THE COGNOSCENTI NOTHING; AS CORRESPONDENT ANDREW BOROWIEC DISCOVERED RECENTLY FROM HIS RESEARCH IN WASHINGTON ON YUGOSLAV-US RELATIONS: "THERE IS NO WILL IN CONGRESS NOR AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO COME TO THE DEFENSE OF A PEOPLE WHO THROW MUD AT US IN THE UNITED NATIONS." IN OTHER WORDS, TO GENERATE SUPPORT FOR YUGOSLV INDEPENDENCE IN THE US, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT GOY UNDERSTAND THAT THEY CANNOT TAKE THE UNITED STATES FOR GRANTED AND THE PRESS WILL BE MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE DEPARTMENT IN DRIVING THAT POINT HOME. A POLICY DESIGNED TO OBSCURE THE TRUE NATURE OF U.S.-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS (WARTS AND ALL) FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IS DOOMED TO FAILURE. IT IS TIME FOR US TO REALIZE THAT AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION IS

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AN ASSET TO THE CODUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY; IT SHOULD NO LONGER BE REGARDED, AS IT IS BY CAREER DIPLOMATS, AS A PAINFUL ENCUMBRANCE. I HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT AMERICANS CAN FULLY UNDERSTAND THE SUBTLITIES -- THE MIX OF GEOSTRATEGIC MULTILATERAL AND IDEOLOGICAL INTERESTS -- OF A SOUND U.S. POLICY TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA.
CAB SILBERMAN

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